Francis Steffan,
Petitioner
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent
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}
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Docket No.
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PETITION
1. Dispute: NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY
2. Date and City, State: MAR 06 2017, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
3. Years: 2005-2009
4. Type of procedure: CONDUCT UNDER REGULAR TAX CASE PROCEDURES
5. TAX COURT PETITION ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:
A) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in presuming jurisdiction under assumption Francis Steffan is a “U.S. citizen” when in fact Francis Steffan is NOT a “U.S. citizen” but in fact is one of the people of The State of Oregon, one of the several States of the perpetual union styled as“The United States of America,” within the organic founding document The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. (see: fact a) )
B) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error as jurisdiction was properly inquired and therefore challenged in response to several notices delivered by the IRS each inquiry was ignored and unanswered. (see: fact b) )
C) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in presuming jurisdiction under assumption Francis Steffan is a “resident” within the “United States.” As defined at 26 USC 7701(a)(9), “The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.” Then at 26 USC 7701(a)(10), “The term “State” shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.” This does not include The State of Oregon, one of the several States of the perpetual union styled as “The United States of America,” within the organic founding document The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. Further, as there is no definition within 26 USC that petitioner can discover it appears “resident” is used much as “person” is used as a mask or as a fiduciary for another which Francis Steffan has never agreed to or volunteered for. (see: fact c))
D) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in presuming jurisdiction under assumption Francis Steffan is a citizen? of the singular United states? under the 14th Amendment and ?ubject to?Title 26 taxes. Francis Steffan has not accepted the offer to become a beneficiary or fiduciary of the 14th amendment public trust. Francis Steffan has no intention of receiving any benefits or privileges from government or any of its Instrumentalities
. Francis Steffan does not voluntarily consent to any compelled benefits or privileges from government or any of its instrumentalities and any compelled use of same is “without prejudice” Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 71.3080 [UCC 1-308]. (see: fact d))
E) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error as no international maritime contract (or other contact) exists wherein Francis Steffan is in privity with the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS is acting as a third party debt collector under some undisclosed contract for some undisclosed third party. [Commissioner has Burden of proof that a contact exists to compel me with a “duty” and “obligation” to perform and if no contact is produced must provide a “liability” statute to make me “liable” to issue a Notice of Deficiency] (see: fact e))
F) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error as no Federal jurisdiction exists over the location Francis Steffan dwells at or worked at per 40 U.S.C 3111 & 3112 without the Federal Government providing proper “Notice of Acceptance” filed by the Federal government with the Governor of The State of Oregon plus any and all other documents necessary under statutory requirements of 40 U.S.C 3111 & 3112 . (see: fact f))
G) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error as Francis Steffan does not “reside” within any Federal Territory hence Federal Jurisdiction does not exist to make Francis Steffan “subject to” Title 26 of United States Code Title 26, Subtitle A & C.
H) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error as the Social Security Act, the Federal Insurance Contribution Act, and the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 are acts passed by Congress under the exclusive authority of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 and Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States and these laws do not apply to Francis Steffan. [Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures, Rule 54 “ ‘Act of Congress’ includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.”]
I) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in presuming jurisdiction under assumption Francis Steffan lived within the “State” as defined at 26 USC 7701(a)(10) which does not include the 50 states of the Union when in fact Francis Steffan lives in the State of Oregon one of the several sovereign States of the perpetual union styled “The United States of America.”
J) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in presuming authority under the assumption the IRS is a “agency” of the United States government. See (a) March 29, 1974 Federal Register page 11,572 “Congress intended to create Bureau of Internal Revenue or thought they had.” (b) Internal Revenue Manual 1100 Section 1111.2(3) “Also it can be seen that Congress had intended to establish a Bureau of Internal Revenue, or thought they had . . . In other words, ‘the office of internal revenue’ was ‘the bureau of internal revenue,’ and the act of July 1, 1862, is the organic act of today’s Internal Revenue Service.” (c) CHRYSLER CORP. v. BROWN, 441 U.S. 281, (1979) Footnote 23 “There was virtually no Washington bureaucracy created by the Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, [ 12 Stat. 432 ], the statute to which the present Internal Revenue Service can be traced.” (d) Diversified Metal Products v T-Bow Company,
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Internal Revenue Service United States Answer and Claim #4 says “Denies that the Internal Revenue Service is an agency of the United States Government” and (e) 26 CFR 31.6011(b)-2(b)(iv) “if services are preformed for an employer other than an employer required to file returns of the taxes imposed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act with the office of the United States Internal Revenue Service in Puerto Rico.” [Commissioner has Burden of proof that the Internal Revenue Service is an “agency” of the United States Treasury Department of Washington, D.C. (not the Treasury Department of Puerto Rico) to have jurisdiction to issue a Notice of Deficiency] (see: fact j))
K) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in operating under color of authority representing the Government of the United States and are in reality a “revenue agent” of a foreign principal. Revenue Agent is defined at 27 CFR § 26.11, “Revenue Agent. Any duly authorized Commonwealth Internal Revenue Agent of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico”
L) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error since aside from places designated as official United States Ports of Entry, the President of the United States (or authorized delegate) has not created or designated “revenue districts” within the sovereign lands of the several states of the Union under the authority of 26 USC §7621 and Executive Order #10289. Francis Steffan does not live within an Internal Revenue District to become “subject to” Title 26 Subtitle A & C taxes.
M) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error since 26 CFR § 601.101 says IRS personnel have jurisdiction for examination and collection only within internal revenue districts and Francis Steffan does not dwell within an Internal Revenue District.
N) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error as Francis Steffan is not made “liable” for personal income tax by 26 USC 1, therefore if Congress did not create the “liability” the IRS regulations 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1 can not create any legal “liability”.
O) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error since Francis Steffan is not a “fiduciary,” “accommodation party” nor volunteers surety for any fictional entity whatsoever.
P) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error as Francis Steffan is one of the people of The State of Oregon, a sovereign State of the perpetual Union styled “The United States of America” and has the protected Right, Article I, Section 10, clause 1 of the United States Constitution, to enter into a private contact within the private sector contracting to exchange his labor, which is private property, for equal compensation without impairment.
Q) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in making an incorrect legal determination that Francis Steffan was classified as a “taxpayer.” Francis Steffan has made the legal determination that Francis Steffan is a “non-taxpayer.”
R) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in issuing a Notice of Deficiency before the required “assessment” was made as required per 26 CFR 601.103(a).
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S) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error as they have no authority to issue a Substitute for Return defined at IRM Exhibit 20.1.1.6-8 “Dictionary of Key Terms” in regards to Form 1040, 1040A or 1040X Substitute for Return per IRM Section 5.1.11.9 “IRC 6020(b) Authority.” (see: fact s))
T) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in determining “gross receipts” is the same as “taxable income” or “income” as shown by these Supreme Court cases which define “income”. Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921), the US Supreme Court held that, “…the word ‘income’ has the same meaning in the Income Tax Act of 1913 that it had in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918), the US Supreme Court stated, “Certainly the term ‘income’ has no broader meaning in the Revenue Act of 1913 than in that of 1909…” Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers, Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918), the US Supreme Court stated, “Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of ‘income,’ it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities.” Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921), the US Supreme Court held that, “The word [income] must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court”. Amendment XVI of the United States Constitution states, “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.” As the supreme court has stated “income” is “something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities.” By all reason, income may be “derived” from wages (or other sources) but is NOT the subject it is derived from anymore than gasoline derived from a crude oil IS crude oil.
U) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error as information they rely on to create the Notice of Deficiency is unverified hearsay and IRS Agents under Rules of Evidence Rule 602, “Lack of Personal Knowledge,” have no personal knowledge in this matter.
V) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error as there is no statute anywhere in Subtitle A and/or Subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code which makes Francis Steffan liable for the tax imposed in 26 U.S.C. 1 or 26 U.S.C. 871.
W) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error when referring to Francis Steffan as an AKA. Francis Steffan is petitioners God given name provided to me by my natural mother and father.
X) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in sending a Notice of Deficiency without having the delegated authority from the Secretary of the Treasury to “determine” that there is a deficiency under 26 U.S.C. 6212.
Y) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in repeatedly refusing to respond to legitimate written inquiries concerning numerous notices in an effort to properly comprehend and perhaps understand the vague and incomplete notices sent to petitioner. As the issuer
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of the notices it is a denial of substantive due process to refuse to respond to legitimate inquiry specifically addressing the content of the notices in order to comprehend the claims against petitioner. What the respondent engages in is akin to a man twice your size demanding you give him money and when you ask him who are you? Why do you demand money? And he just tells you to shut up and give me the money, or else.
Z) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in repeatedly refusing to respond to legitimate written inquiries concerning numerous notices in an effort to properly comprehend and perhaps understand the vague and incomplete notices sent to petitioner. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service through his agents as the issuer of notice have a duty to respond to legitimate inquiries to those notices and to purposely refuse to do so can only be equated to fraud and fraud is not only a tort and possibly a crime it is certainly evidence of bad faith.
AA) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in purportedly generating a “substitute for return” under the authority of IRC 6020(b) to Francis Steffan as the enforcement regulations for IRC 6020(b) only apply to taxable activities regulated through the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives to which Francis Steffan is in no way engaged.
BB) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in purportedly generating a “substitute for return” under the authority of IRC 6020(b) as the only way this could be generated through the IRS computer system for Francis Steffan is to enter knowingly inaccurate information for the sole purpose of fraudulently creating the illusion of a tax liability that does not exist which is a clear indication of fraud and absolutely bad faith.
CC) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error by not providing Francis Steffan a copy of the actual purported “substitute for return” return that was purportedly generated and signed under penalty of perjury as required at 26 U.S.C. § 6065 as the basis for the purported deficiencies. Without Francis Steffan being able to examine the document which is the basis for the claims made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service through his agents the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service through his agents has made it impossible for Francis Steffan to determine the legitimacy of the claims. This is akin to a stranger walking up to you and claiming you owe him $50,000 now pay up or else without providing any documentation of liability.
DD) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error by not providing Francis Steffan a copy of Form 13496, IRC section 6020(b) Certification. However, Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service through his agents would still be in error even if form 13496 was provided as that “certification” subscription has no penalties of perjury as part of form 13496 as required by 26 U.S.C. § 6065.
EE) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error by not providing Francis Steffan a copy of the IMF MCC Transcript Complete that corresponds to petitioner as has been requested by Francis Steffan in order to discover and correct errors that are necessarily present can only be equated with fraud and bad faith.
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FF) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in presuming Francis Steffan is a man liable for “income tax” as there is no law that applies to Francis Steffan in his true and correct nature to make Francis Steffan subject or liable for “income tax.” (see: fact e) )
GG) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in presuming Francis Steffan is a “person,” “individual,” “human,” “human being,” ”natural person” or any other corporal or legal or other fiction. Francis Steffan is a man made by the God of Abraham, Issac and Jacob in the image of That God as declared within the Holy Bible at Genesis 1: 26-28
HH) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent’s error in presuming Francis Steffan has voluntarily agreed to be fiduciary and/or surety in anyway at anytime concerning any relationship with any fictional entity or otherwise. Francis Steffan, one of “the people,” is a beneficiary of the trust relationship created by the Constitution of The State of Oregon, one of the several States of The United States of America, a perpetual Union, as styledd in The articles of Confederation and through that trust relationship with the State of Oregon trust Francis Steffan, one of “the people,” is also a beneficiary to the Constitution of [for] the United States, a perpetual union, and Francis Steffan at all times instructs and demands the fiduciaries, in whatever capacity I find them, to execute the trust on my behalf for my benefit; I at no time consent to be surety in any way whatsoever.
6. STATE THE FACTS UPON WHICH YOU RELY:
a) Within the United States Constitution in the fourteenth amendment “United States” is referred to in the singular as an separate entity from the several States of the perpetual union “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States…nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction…” The wording is in stark contrast to the “United States” referred to within the thirteenth amendment which is referred to in the plural “…shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” Further, under the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, one of “The Organic Laws of The United States of America” as found at Volume 18 of the Revised Statutes of the United States as enacted by the forty-third Congress (A.D. 1873-1875) and published by the Government Printing Office in A.D. 1878. Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. Article I. The styled of this Confederacy shall be “The United States of America.” Article II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”
“The United States of America” is the “styled” or phrase that was used to describe the Union formed legally by those Articles among the several sovereign States. The Articles clearly distinguished “United States of America” from “United States” in Congress assembled. The States formally delegated certain powers to the federal government, which is clearly identified in those Articles as the “United States”. Therefore, the “United States of America” now refers to the fifty sovereign States of the perpetual
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Union, and the term “United States” refers to the federal government. In addition, the supreme court has ruled there is more than one “United States,” “The term ‘United States’ may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution,” Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt 324 U.S. 652 (1945)
b) “No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction” Stanard v. Olesen, 74 S. Ct. 768. “Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be ‘assumed’, it must be proved to exist.” Stuck v. Board of Medical Examiners,94 Cal2d 751 “The canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a countrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” Blackmer v. United States, supra, 284 U.S. at 437, 52 S.Ct. at page 254 “Jurisdiction is essential to give validity to the determinations of administrative agencies and where jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied, the action of the agency is a nullity..” [City Street Improv Co. v. Pearson, 181 C 640,185 P. (1962); O’Neil v. Dept. of Professional & Vocational Standards, 7 CA2d 393, 46 P2d 234]. “Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted.” Latana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York37 F Supp. 150.
c) As there appears to be no definition within 26 USC for “resident,” therefore, as dealings between States of the perpetual union are considered “foreign” petitioner will rely on the definition from international law; RESIDENT, international law. The resident does not represent the prince’s person in his dignity, but only his affairs. His representation is in reality of the same nature as that of the envoy; hence he is often termed, as well as the envoy, a minister of the second order, thus distinguishing only two classes of public ministers, the former consisting of ambassadors who are invested with the representative character in preeminence, the latter comprising all other ministers, who do not possess that exalted character. This is the most necessary distinction, and indeed the only essential one. Vattel liv. 4, c. 6, 73. Further, based upon Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 240 U.S. 1 (1916) where Brushaber identified himself as a Citizen of New York State and nobody challenged that claim after the decision against Brushaber the Treasury Department issued a Treasury Decision expressly cited the Brushaber decision, and it identified Frank Brushaber as a “nonresident alien” and the Union Pacific Railroad Company as a “domestic corporation” as it was chartered in “Utah” before it was a State of the Union.
d) It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) – We have in our political system a Government of the United States and a government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own ….U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) – One may be a citizen of a State and yet not a citizen of the United States. Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (17 Am. R. 738); McCarthy v. Froelke, 63 Ind. 507; In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443.McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320, 323 (1883) – That there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a state, and the privileges and immunities of one are not the same as the other is well established by the decisions of the courts of this country. Tashiro v. Jordan, 201 Cal. 236 (1927) – The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects very few rights because it neither incorporates any of the Bill of Rights nor protects all rights of individual citizens. [See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873).] Instead, this
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provision protects only those rights peculiar to being a citizen of the federal government; it does not protect those rights which relate to state citizenship. Jones v. Temmer, 829 F.Supp. 1226 (USDC/DCO 1993) – Also see: 6(a)
e) The regulations at 26 CFR 1.1-1 attempt to create a specific liability for all “citizens of the United States” and all “residents of the United States”. However, those regulations correspond to IRC section 1, which does not create a specific liability for taxes imposed by subtitle A. “[A]n administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, especially a liability for a tax or inspection fee.” Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 4 L.Ed.2d 127, 80 S.Ct. 144 (1959)
f) 40 U.S.C 3111 & 3112
g) see: 6-a, b, c & d
h) see: 6-a, b, c, d, f & g
i) The only position created by 31 U.S.C 301 which is the organizational and administrative code for the “Department of the Treasury”concerning the “Internal Revenue Service” is “an Assistant General Counsel who shall be the Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service.” There is no reference to the creation of the “Internal Revenue Service.” At footnote 23 in the case of Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court admitted that no organic Act for the IRS could be found. Since there was no organic Act creating it, IRS is not a lawful organization. From 27 CFR 26.11 which is the enforcement regulation for 26 U.S.C 6301 which states, “The Secretary shall collect the taxes imposed by the internal revenue laws. “Revenue Agent. Any duly authorized Commonwealth Internal Revenue Agent of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico. Secretary. The Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico. Secretary or his delegate. The Secretary or any officer or employee of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico duly authorized by the Secretary to perform the function mentioned or described in this part.
j) 5.1.11.6.7 (04-23-2014) IRC 6020(b) Authority. The following returns may be prepared, signed and executed by revenue officers under the authority of IRC 6020(b): Form 940, Employer’s Annual Federal Unemployment Tax Return, Form 941, Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return, Form 943, Employer’s Annual Tax Return for Agricultural Employees, Form 944, Employer’s Annual Federal Tax Return, Form 720, Quarterly Federal Excise Tax Return, Form 2290, Heavy Highway Vehicle Use Tax Return, Form CT-1, Employer’s Annual Railroad Retirement Tax Return, Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income. Francis Steffan is not an “employer,” Francis Steffan is not engaged in any activity that is subject to an excise tax, Francis Steffan is not engaged in any Heavy Highway Vehicle Use, Francis Steffan is not involved in any partnership.
k) It has never been nor is the intention or will of the man Francis Steffan to be a “citizen” of the singular “united states” as set forth in the fourteenth amendment of the united states constitution.
l) It has never been nor is the intention or will of the man Francis Steffan to be a “united states person” in anyway shape or form for any reason at any time.
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m) It has never been nor is the intention or will of the man Francis Steffan to “reside” within the singular “united states,” one of its “states”, districts or territories in anyway shape or form for any reason at any time.
n) It has been and is the intention and will of the man Francis Steffan to be “one of the People” of the State of Oregon, one of the several sovereign States of the perpetual union styled “The United States of America.”
o) The man, Francis Steffan is a beneficiary of the trust relationship between ?he People,?of which he is one, and the government created by the trust document ?onstitution of The State of Oregon?and at all times demands the trust be executed in his favor for his benefit. The man, Francis Steffan, as one of The People of The State of Oregon is also a beneficiary of the trust relationship created by the constitution for the United States of America through The State of Oregon inclusion in the perfected trust relationship created between the several sovereign States of the perpetual union known as The Constitution for the United States of America.
p) It has never been, nor is now, the intention or will of the man Francis Steffan to be fiduciary in anyway for any person or other fiction for any reason under any circumstance whatsoever.
q) It has never been, nor is now, the intention or will of the man Francis Steffan to be or provide by any means surety in any trust relationship or otherwise.
r) Francis Steffan is not a “taxpayer” as defined within 26 U.S.C.
s) Francis Steffan is only a man created by and in the image of The God of Abraham, Issac and Jacob as stated in the Holy Bible (KJV) at Genesis 1: 26-28.
t) The man, Francis Steffan has the Right to freely exercise his religion and the federal government is forbidden to prohibit that free exercise. Constitution of the United States, Amendment I, congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;…?and the Constitution of The State of Oregon Article I, Section 2. All men shall be secure in the Natural right, to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. 3. No law shall in any case whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of religeous [sic] opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.?Where rights secured by the constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.?Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436
u) The man, Francis Steffan is not a person. All men are created equal in right, persons are not created equal. A person may purchase and own another person. The Constitution for the United States of America declares in part at the Fourth Amendment (sixth original article): the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated? It is self evident, people possess persons?as they would houses, papers and effects, persons are not The people. Instead, persons are attributes or capacities of people. people?are real and primary; persons are relational, derivative and/or secondary; therefore I am not a person. Person derives from the Latin persona, an actors mask, men combined wearing the mask of a legal entity create a person, a singular man wearing the
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mask of a ?egal entity?is known as a ?atural person?or an ?ndividual.?In Roman civil law jus personarum did not mean law of persons, or rights of people, but law of status, or condition.
v) The man, Francis Steffan is not an individual.
w) The man, Francis Steffan is not human or a human being and withholds consent to being classified as a human and/or human being. The etymology of the word(s) strongly evidence that, human is another derivative of a man made in the image of God, but not the man, much as person is derivative of a Holy Bible at Genesis 1: 26-28 man: Human (adj.) mid-15c., humain, humaigne, human, from Old French humain, umain (adj.) ?f or belonging to man?(12c.), from Latin humanus ?f man, human. Human (n.) human being, 1530s, from human (adj.).
x) Commissioner of internal revenue service through his Agents continue to fail to responded to ANY of numerous legitimate inquiries to their notices. They have instead referred to my inquiries as arguments deemed them frivolous and refused to provide any answers to any questions all regarding notices they initiated. Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading… We cannot condone this shocking conduct… If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately?” U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F2d 997, 299-300
y) Commissioner of internal revenue service through his Agents continue to fail to provide requested documentation such as Individual Master File MCC TRANSCRIPT-SPECIFIC (IMF) that they rely on for the claims they make against petitioner. “Suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation.” Leigh v. Loyd, 244 P.2d 356, 74 Ariz. 84-(1952)
z) Commissioner of internal revenue service through his Agents claim they have made and issued petitioner a 6020(b) substitute for return yet they have failed to provide the actual subscribed by the Secretary return to petitioner. “Where relation of trust or confidence exists between two parties so that one places peculiar reliance in trustworthiness of another, latter is under duty to make full and truthful disclosure of all material facts and is liable for misrepresentation or concealment?” Stewart v. Phoenix Nat. Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 49 Ariz. 34-(Ariz. 1937)
aa) Commissioner of internal revenue service through his Agents claim they have made and issued petitioner a 6020(b) substitute for return yet the enforcement regulations, 27 CFR Part 53 & 70, corresponding to the 6020(b) claimed substitute for return only apply to taxable activities exclusively regulated through the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
bb) Petitioner is not engaged, nor has been, in any activities regulated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
cc) Commissioner of internal revenue service through his Agents are misapplying statutory law to fraudulently create a liability where no liability exists in reality or law.
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dd) A]n administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, especially a liability for a tax or inspection fee.?Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 4 L.Ed.2d 127, 80 S.Ct. 144 (1959)
ee) All petitioners dealings that involve compensation are done on an equal value exchange with no gain or profit and are done by contractual obligation. Article I, Section 10, Constitution for the United States of America. “…no state shall enter into…law impairing the obligation of contracts.” The States of the perpetual union are forbidden to make law impairing the obligation of contracts and there is no provision within The Constitution for the United States of America granting the federal government the power to make law impairing the obligation of contracts therefore, to exercise such power is unconstitutional.
ff) Petitioner, Francis Steffan is not a employer.
gg) Petitioner, Francis Steffan is not a employee.
hh) Petitioner, Francis Steffan is not a withholding agent.
ii) Petitioner, Francis Steffan holds no business license.
jj) Petitioner, Francis Steffan has no income as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States: There can be no doubt that the word [“income”] must be given the same meaning and content in in the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917 that it had in the Act of 1913. When to this we add that in Eisner v Macomber, supra, a case arising from the same Income Tax Act of 1916 which is here involved, the definition of “income” which was applied was adopted from Stratton’s Independence v Howbert, supra, arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, with the addition that it should include “profit gained through the sale or conversion of capital assets”, there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court.?Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co v Smietanka (1921), 255 US 509.; “The claim that salaries, wages, and compensation for personal services are to be taxed as an entirety and therefore must be returned by the individual who has performed the services which produce the gain is without support… it is not salaries, wages, or compensation for personal services that are to be included in gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal services.” Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); “There is a clear distinction between `profit’ and `wages’, or a compensation for labor. Compensation for labor (wages) cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law. The word `profit’, as ordinarily used, means the gain made upon any business or investment — a different thing altogether from the mere compensation for labor.” Oliver v. Halstead, 86 S.E. Rep 2nd 85e9 (1955); “… whatever may constitute income, therefore, must have the essental feature of gain to the recipient. This was true when the 16th Amendment became effective, it was true at the time of Eisner v. Macomber Supra, it was true under Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1938, and it is likewise true under Section 61(a) of the I.R.S. Code of 1954. If there is not gain, there is not income … Congress has taxed income not compensation.” Conner v. U.S., 303 F Supp. 1187 (1969); and INCOME. The gain which proceeds from property, labor, or business; it is applied particularly to individuals; the income of the government is usually called revenue. Bouviers law dictionary 1856.
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kk) Commissioner of internal revenue service through his Agents have acted and continue to act in Bad Faith. Bad Faith: The opposite of “good faith,” generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive. Hilgenberg v. Northup, 134 Ind. 92, 33 N. E. 780; Morton v. Immigration Ass’n, 79 Ala. 617; Coleman v. Billings, 89 111. 191; Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 South. 66, 61 L. R. A. 274; Harris v. Harris, 70 Pa. 174; Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Trust Co., 73 Fed. 653, 19 C. C. A. 310, 38 L. R. A. 33, 70; Insurance Co. v. Edwards, 74 Ga. 230.
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